Effects of a Standard Landing Lights Message on Runway Safety by Sierra, Edmundo A., Jr. et al.
Wright State University 
CORE Scholar 
International Symposium on Aviation 
Psychology - 2007 
International Symposium on Aviation 
Psychology 
2007 
Effects of a Standard Landing Lights Message on Runway Safety 
Edmundo A. Sierra Jr. 
Karen Buondonno 
Nicole S. Racine 
Kimberlea Bender 
Follow this and additional works at: https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/isap_2007 
 Part of the Other Psychiatry and Psychology Commons 
Repository Citation 
Sierra, E. A., Buondonno, K., Racine, N. S., & Bender, K. (2007). Effects of a Standard Landing Lights 
Message on Runway Safety. 2007 International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 651-656. 
https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/isap_2007/24 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the International Symposium on Aviation Psychology at 
CORE Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in International Symposium on Aviation Psychology - 2007 by an 
authorized administrator of CORE Scholar. For more information, please contact library-corescholar@wright.edu. 
EFFECTS OF A STANDARD LANDING LIGHTS MESSAGE ON RUNWAY SAFETY
Edmundo A. Sierra, Jr.
FAA, Air Traffic Organization, Operations Planning Services
Washington, DC
Karen Buondonno
FAA, Air Traffic Organization, Operations Planning Services
Atlantic City International Airport, NJ
Nicole S. Racine
L-3 Com Titan Corporation
Atlantic City International Airport, NJ
Kimberlea Bender
CSSI, Inc.
Egg Harbor Township, NJ
The Federal Aviation Administration Office of Runway Safety and Operational Services formed a simulation team
to investigate the safety effects of standardizing the use of aircraft landing lights in the airport environment.
Specifically, the simulation team explored the procedural use of landing lights as a direct message to other pilots
indicating that aircraft were cleared to depart. Thirty-two pilots participated in the study as either the Captain or First
Officer of a B747-400 simulator crew. The simulator crews were divided into two groups or crews. Each crew flew
either a set of 16 scenarios in an environment with a standardized use of landing lights or scenarios using current
practices. In four of the scenarios in each environment, a confederate aircraft made an error that resulted in a runway
incursion (RI) that could have resulted in an accident with the B747-400 simulator if not detected by the subject
crews. Multidimensional measures of RI severity and situation awareness (SA) were made after each scenario. In
general, the pattern of results suggest that standardizing the use of aircraft landing lights to indicate that aircraft were
cleared to depart prevented or reduced the severity of RIs or accidents, and increased pilot SA. The data shows that
crews in the standard condition held-short more frequently, generally experienced less severe incursions, initiated a
response to RIs significantly faster, used the landing lights effectively as a first cue, and unanimously felt that safety
was increased because of the standardized procedures.
Introduction
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Office
of Runway Safety and Operational Services formed a
simulation team to investigate the safety effects of
standardizing the use of aircraft landing lights in the
airport environment. The purpose of this
investigation was to gather subjective and
performance data from flight crews as they operated
in scenarios with and without standard exterior
lighting procedures. Specifically, the simulation team
explored the procedural use of landing lights as a
direct message to other pilots indicating that aircraft
were cleared to depart. The necessary data included a
measure of runway incursions (RI), accidents, and
pilot situation awareness (SA).
The goal of this study was to investigate whether
standardizing the use of aircraft landing lights to
indicate that aircraft were cleared to depart (1)
prevented or reduced the severity of RIs or accidents,
and (2) increased pilot SA.  We expected greater
safety, SA to increase, and positive pilot reactions to
the procedure because landing lights are a more
salient visual cue than the motion of aircraft.  In some
cases, this visual cue is available earlier than motion.
This paper describes the simulation, which was a
proof-of-concept study. In this study, we explored a
baseline condition representing current use of
procedures and a condition with the new Standard
Operating Procedure (SOP). In each condition, four
data collection scenarios included a scripted error by
a confederate pilot (a simulated aircraft whose crew
was under our control) that induced a potential
RI/accident. The simulation utilized the Crew
Vehicle Systems Research Facility (CVSRF) at
NASA Ames Research Center. In particular, the
study employed NASA’s Level D certified, Boeing
747-400 simulator. The simulation team and sponsor
selected San Francisco International Airport (SFO)




The Runway Incursion Joint Safety Implementation
Team (RI JSIT) was chartered by the Commercial
Aviation Safety Team (CAST) and General Aviation
Joint Steering Committee to develop a plan to
effectively reduce the severe threat of fatalities and
loss caused by commercial and general aviation RI
accidents/incidents. CAST’s goal is to reduce the US
commercial aviation fatal accident rate by 80% by
the end of the year 2007. To help accomplish this
goal, the RI JSIT brought together expert
representatives from across the aviation community
including participants from government, industry,
and pilot and controller unions. These experts
developed, prioritized, and coordinated a plan to
implement the most effective analytically data-driven
intervention strategies recommended by the Runway
Incursion Joint Safety Analysis Team. RI JSIT
analyzed those intervention strategies to determine
the feasibility of gaining significant safety benefits
through implementation. They incorporated twenty-
two Safety Enhancements into seven detailed
Implementation Plans (FAA, 2002). One of these
plans is to develop SOPs for ground operations; more
specifically, SOPs relating to aircraft taxi operations
and use of aircraft lighting during taxi operations.
Approach
Our approach was to use a between-subjects design
to compare the outcome of scenarios operating under
the current practices and those using the SOPs
relating to the use of aircraft lighting during taxi
operations.   This  approach was  as  close  as  the  team
could get to the actual outcomes without risk to the
participants. We looked for differences in safety,
situation awareness, and pilot reactions. We took a
variety of measurements to indicate differences in
these constructs between the groups. We expected
greater safety, situation awareness to increase, and
positive pilot reactions to the SOP.
Method
Participants
Thirty-two pilots participated in the study as either
the Captain or First Officer of the B747-400
simulator during the simulation. The simulation team
recruited pilots from sources such as the airlines, the
Airline Pilots Association, and the Allied Pilots
Association. Participants were current or
retired/furloughed (9 months or less) B747-400 type-
rated Captains or First Officers.
It was desirable that both pilots of each crew were
from the same company; however, 4 of the 16 crews
were from different or ‘mixed’ companies. Twelve of
the crews were from United Airlines (UAL);
therefore, we instructed the crews to use the B747-
400 cockpit configuration and a checklist from UAL.
The mixed crews used the Captain’s configuration
and checklist, when possible, and we provided
additional training to the First Officer to mitigate any
potential effects. If the Captain’s configuration and/or
checklist were not available, the pilots used UAL’s
and we trained one or both members of the crew (as
appropriate) to mitigate any potential effects. The
FAA and NASA personnel provided familiarity and
procedural training as needed.
In this study, we instructed the crews to taxi, depart,
or land in 16 scenarios. Sixteen crews composed of a
Captain and First Officer participated in this study.
Eight of the crews operated in an environment that
had no standard procedures for using landing lights to
indicate that aircraft are cleared to depart; the other
eight operated in an environment with standard
procedures.  In half of the scenarios that every crew
experienced, a confederate aircraft made an error that
resulted in an incursion with the potential to result in
an accident if not detected by the subject crews. Four
of these scenarios for each crew were included in the
final analysis.
Apparatus
The CVSRF is a unique national research facility
dedicated to studies of aviation human factors and
airspace operations and their impact upon aviation
safety. An integral component of the CVSRF is the
B747-400 simulator.
CAE Electronics built NASA’s B747-400 simulator
to meet the FAA Level D certification requirements
(Sullivan & Soukup, 1996). The Boeing 747-400 has
an advanced level of automation available to the
pilots. The visual system uses photo texturing and
offers superior scene quality depicting out the
window scenes in night, day, dusk, or dawn
conditions. In addition, the simulator has an advanced
digital control loading and a six degree-of-freedom
motion system. Data collection was available for user
interaction with all subsystems, including the
autopilot system and communication devices.
Procedure
Instructions to Participants. During the initial briefing,
we provided crews with minimal information about the
study objectives. In particular, they were not made
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aware of planned incursions, nor were they given
feedback regarding whether an incursion occurred
unless they elicited feedback about an event as they
would during actual operations. We instructed crews to
taxi, depart, and land aircraft using the same
consideration for efficiency and vigilance for safety that
they would in a real-world environment. We then
trained crews to use the aircraft lighting procedures
corresponding to their condition assignment (standard or
no standard). We also reviewed the procedures during
the simulator orientation. We instructed eight of the
crews, those in the no standard condition, to follow the
current aircraft policies (including lighting policies) of
the Captain’s company. All other aircraft (i.e., other than
the Boeing 747-400) in the no standard conditions also
complied with their appropriate company policies. We
instructed the other eight crews, those in the standard
condition, to follow the SOP for light usage as written in
Advisory Circular (AC) 120-74A. After completion of
two training scenarios, we assessed the participants’
understanding of the lighting SOP with a written test.
All other aircraft in the standard conditions followed
the same SOP.
Experimental Manipulations. This study design
included the ‘Standardization’ factor and it had two
levels. The first level, no standard, represented a taxi
environment in which the aircraft used the present
policies and culture of selected airlines for aircraft
lighting during taxi operations. The second level,
standard, represented a taxi, position and hold, and
takeoff environment in which the recommended
standardization of procedures for the use of aircraft
lighting were in effect per the AC 120-74A.  The AC
advises that to signal intent to aircraft downfield, turn
on landing lights when cleared for takeoff.  All
aircraft were scripted to comply correctly with the
SOPs contained in AC 120-74A during the standard
condition without exception.
The study design included independent groups. We
chose this design instead of a within-subjects design
because it was considered unreasonable to expect
flight crews to switch from using one set of rules
during taxi to the current practice without being
influenced by the preceding conditions they received.
The levels of Standardization (no standard and
standard) constitute the independent (between-
subjects) groups. We divided the study crews into
two groups: half of the crews were placed in the no
standard condition and the other half were placed in
the standard condition.
Control Features. The simulation team used
counterbalancing to neutralize the effects of order as
well as to provide a washout period after incursions.
Practice effects (e.g., carryover, sensitization, and
practice effects) were not the objects of study and the
presence of practice effects could reduce the
sensitivity of the design. Therefore, we used a Latin
square arrangement of the airports (namely, SFO &
ORD) and a random arrangement of the scenarios.
After the initial briefing, the participants signed an
Informed Consent Form and completed a
Background Questionnaire. The participants
experienced two training runs and then completed the
16 test scenarios. During the scenarios, subject matter
experts (SMEs) collected event information. The
participants completed a Situation Awareness Rating
Technique (SART) Questionnaire (Taylor, 1990) at
the end of each scenario. The SMEs completed an
Observer Rating Form after each test scenario. After
completion of the last scenario, the participants
completed a Post-Simulation Questionnaire and
participated in a final debriefing.
Results
Hold Short
We used the Fisher exact probability test to
determine whether there was a difference in terms of
the number of prevented incursions between the
Standardization conditions. The null hypothesis was
that  the  crews  did  not  hold  short  as  a  function  of
standardization group. The alternative hypothesis was
that the crews using standard lighting procedures
were able to prevent more incursions.
We counted the number of crews that held short for
each scenario. Crews taxiing in the standard
condition held short more frequently than crews with
no  standard  for  3  of  the  4  scenarios.  When  we
determined the probability of the outcomes using the
Fisher exact probability test, the respective
probabilities (p) for ORD 1, ORD 2, SFO 1, and SFO
2 were .23, .07, .30, and .23. Thus, we could not
reject the null hypothesis at an alpha level of .05.
Number of Runway Incursions and Accidents
We used the robust rank-order test to determine if the
severity of incursions in the no standard group was
higher than those in the standard group. The null
hypothesis was that the sum of the severity ratings
across the four scenarios was the same for the standard
and no standard groups. The alternative hypothesis
was that the sum of the standard group’s ratings was
higher than those of the no standard group.
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We counted the number of incursions that resulted in
each type of scenario. Of the 64 incursions that were
planned in the data collection scenarios, 29 resulted
in actual incursions and the rest did not meet the
criteria  for  a  RI.  The  incursions  were  divided  into
three different descriptive categories: stopped short
of  runway  edge,  crossed  the  runway  and  exited  the
runway,  and  collision.  Overall  there  were  11  RIs  in
the standard condition and 18 (or 63% more) in the
no  standard  condition.  In  3  of  4  scenarios,  the  no
standard crews were involved in more incursions.
Furthermore, the no standard crews were also
involved in 3 collisions compared to 1 collision in the
standard group. The probabilities of these outcomes
did not reach statistical significance.
Initiating a Response
The data set was characterized by unequal samples
and variances. Therefore, we chose nonparametric
statistics to analyze the data. We used the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test to determine
whether the two samples were drawn from the same
population or populations with the same distribution.
The null hypothesis was that there was no difference
in the reaction times between the standard and no
standard conditions. The alternative hypothesis was
that there was a difference in the reaction times
between  the  environments.  Results  were  in  favor  of
rejecting the null hypothesis (Dm,n = .86, p < .05).
There was a statistically significant difference in
reaction times between the two conditions indicating
that the standard condition (i.e., SOP) reduced crew
initial response times to RIs (see Figure 1).
Figure 1.  Mean (+/- standard deviation) Initial
Response Times in Seconds
Initial response time results suggest that an optimal level
of SA occurs sooner. The 3D SART rating trend of
responses showed a slight increase in SA for Captains,
although there may not have been enough power to
detect the difference statistically. However, the objective
supplementary measure to SA, initial response times to
impending incursions involving a departing aircraft,
were significantly faster for crews taxing in the standard
condition. Given accurate knowledge of events in the
environment (namely, an aircraft departing), a faster
response means greater safety.
Use of Landing Lights as a First Cue
When we looked at the data by scenario and
determined the probability of the outcomes using the
Fisher exact probability test, the respective
probabilities (p) for ORD 1, ORD 2, SFO 1, and SFO
2 were .54, .02, .03, and .02. Thus, results for three of
the scenarios were statistically significant. Crews in
the standard condition reported more frequently that
their first cue of an impending incursion was “lights.”
Pilot Reactions
One hundred percent of the standard group
participants indicated that they believed that the
SOPs increased safety to some degree and felt
confident using the new procedures. Participants’
median response was 7 (1=Decreased Safety,
7=Increased Safety), or Increased Safety, when asked
what effect, if any, the standardized landing light
procedures had on runway traffic safety.
Furthermore, none of the respondents indicated a
neutral response or felt that safety was degraded in
any way. These scores are consistent with debriefing
comments and questionnaire feedback provided by
the participants. When asked to expand upon the
safety aspect of using standardized lighting
procedures, 100% of the participants said that another
aircraft’s intent was more clearly indicated with a
universal lighting system. They also indicated that
they were able to react more quickly to potential
situations than if they had to ascertain that there was
a conflict by using the movement cue alone.
Confidence in Standardized Procedures. Participants
reportedly felt confident using the SOPs. One
hundred percent of the participants responded 5 or
higher, with a median of 7, when asked if they were
confident utilizing the standardized lighting
procedures  (1=Not  at  All,  7=A  Great  Deal).  Scores
strongly suggest that no participants had reservations
relying on the lighting procedures as a messaging
system in the simulation. These scores were also
consistent with debriefing comments. Participants
often commented that with good training and
consistent use of the lighting procedures, the SOPs
would provide a tremendous benefit overall.
Crew Debriefing Commentary. As previously
mentioned, the focus of this study was to provide
objective data as evidence to support or disprove the
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value of implementing a standard use of exterior
aircraft lighting, particularly the use of aircraft
landing lights. However, some subjective comments
are included in the results as supplementary
information. As such, we drew several observations
from  the  debriefing  sessions  of  the  crews  that
experienced the standard conditions. In general, pilot
reactions to the SOPs were very positive.
• All crews commented during the debrief
sessions that they experienced increased SA
when using the standard lighting procedures.
They contributed the increase to clear
communication of other aircrafts’ intent.
• All crews agreed the overt signals
communicated by the standard lighting
procedures would provide a great benefit in
the real world as long as the procedures
were used correctly and consistently.
• All crews thought it was a good idea to
implement the standard lighting procedures
across all airlines and aircraft.
We also extracted pilot feedback from post-
simulation questionnaires. In particular, pilots that
flew  in  the  standard  conditions  were  asked  how  the
standardized landing light procedures affected
runway traffic safety during the simulation, if at all.
All replies were positive and included responses such
as the following: “You were able to have better
situation awareness and increased reaction time”,
“Once the light system is understood, detection of
movement is enhanced. Also, flight crew’s intentions
are indicated earlier,” “Lights visible long before
movement,” “Provided early indication of intentions
of other aircraft to either cross a runway or
commence takeoff roll,” and “Gave a good overt
indication of what to expect from other aircraft.”
This feedback from the professional pilots that had
the opportunity to experience the affect of the new
SOP in a high fidelity simulation environment clearly
indicates favorable views toward the procedures.
Discussion
Subjective and performance data were analyzed to
explore the procedural use of aircraft landing lights
as a direct message to other pilots indicating that
aircraft were cleared to depart. In general, the pattern
of results supports the standardized use of the landing
lights. Conclusions for this study are largely
supported by the combination of observed patterns
and trends in the data and subjective information
gathered from the participants. In summary, the data
shows that crews in the standard condition held-short
more frequently, generally experienced less severe
RIs when those occurred, initiated a response to RIs
significantly faster, used the landing lights effectively
as a first cue, and unanimously felt that safety was
increased because of the standardized procedures.
The data showed with marginal significance that
crews taxiing in an environment with a standard use
of landing lights held-short more frequently (thereby
preventing more incursions) than those with no
standard. Crews with no standard crossed the runway
with greater frequency and were involved in more
collisions. As observed in the descriptive data, crews
generally experienced incursions that were more
severe when operating without a standard use of
landing lights. The effect of having and not having a
standardized use of the landing lights showed itself
through repeated safe behaviors and unsafe behaviors
respectively.
Landing  lights  provided  a  faster  cue  that  there  was
potential for a collision than movement. When
examining an aircraft on an intersecting runway, the
primary concern of the crew was whether that aircraft
was moving. If movement were easy to perceive, it
would  be  sufficient  as  a  cue  that  there  is  a  potential
for a collision. However, movement of the other
aircraft is difficult to perceive because it is at such a
great distance and its speed increases exponentially
as it takes off (Regan, 1997). The standard procedure
if applied correctly, however, provides an easy
message: landing lights on means the aircraft is
moving and landing lights off means that it is not
moving. Given that landing lights are more easily
detected than movement (as simulated), they provide
a message faster than movement.
Feedback from the professional pilots who had the
opportunity to experience the effects of the new
procedure in this high fidelity simulation
environment clearly indicated favorable views toward
standardizing  the  use  of  landing  lights.  They  felt  it
contributed to safety, increased their awareness of the
intentions of other aircraft, and that it conveyed the
intended message effectively.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Air Traffic Organization, Federal Aviation
Administration, or the Department of Transportation.
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